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Following the recent financial crisis, it is sometimes argued that financial institutions should be regulated to a greater 
extent than before in order to prevent a recurrence of global financial crises. It is argued here that since banks create 
liquidity ex nihilo in exchange for financial collaterals whose nominal values are subject to market fluctuations, in 
general, banks’ regulation can have only a limited effect on the stability of the financial system. Monetary policy of 









It is the norm in the banking system that loans make 
deposits (e.g., Allais, 1987). For any IOU from a borrower 
maturing at a certain date in the future the bank issues a loan 
for payment on call. Thus, the bank’s balance sheet is a 
double entry where the liabilities are the bank’s loans 
payable on call and the assets are the borrowers’ IOUs 
payable to the bank sometime in the future. Accordingly, the 
creation of loans, and thereby liquidity, by banks is not 
restricted by demand deposits; the creation of liquidity is an 
internal decision of the bank and is not dictated by the 
volume of the bank’s demand deposits. (The creation of 
liquidity is an internal decision of the bank because the bank 
itself decides which IOUs are sufficiently credible for the 
provision of loans.) Accordingly, it is argued here that  
based on the fact that (i) loans make demand deposits, and 
(ii) banks make loans in exchange for collaterals, in the form 
of IOUs, whose nominal values depend on the state of the 
economy (e.g., the housing market)  the stability of the 
banking sector depends on economic stability. Thus, 
financial crises, and in particular banking crises, are 
symptoms of economic crises, where economic booms are 
reversed by economic downturns. This scenario contrasts 
the current literature (e.g., Diamond & Dybvig, 1983; Green 
& Lin, 2000) where it is claimed that short term deposits 
make long term loans and consequently mistrust amongst 
depositors is to blame for bank runs and financial instability. 
According to that literature, the suspicion and fear of 
depositors that a significant number of depositors may 
decide to withdraw their demand deposits from a bank is the 
cause for the bank to run out of liquidity and consequently 
to declare bankruptcy. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section outlines 
the current approach to bank runs which is based on a game 
theoretic approach of depositors’ strategic behaviour. In the 
same section the shortcoming of this approach to explain 
financial instability is discussed. In the third section an 
alternative approach, based on the norm that loans make 
deposits (Allais, 1987), and that therefore liquidity may be 
created ex nihilo, is presented. The mortgage market was the 
trigger for the recent global financial crisis. Accordingly, the 
fourth section considers the mortgage market as a case in 
point. Policy implications conclude. 
 
A game theoretic approach to depositors’ 
strategies    
 
The seminal approach to bank runs and financial instability 
is Diamond and Dybvig (1983). According to that approach 
banks keep a greater proportion of loans than demand 
deposits. Therefore the time at which depositors withdraw 
their deposits from the bank is a manifestation whether a run 
is due to take place or not. In particular, if all depositors of a 
bank are to withdraw their deposits simultaneously, the bank 
will run out of liquidity and will have to declare bankruptcy. 
Thus, depositors who initially plan to keep their deposits for 
a long period of time face a dilemma between keeping their 
deposits for a long period, as they intended initially, and 
thereby get a relatively high return while assuming the risk 
of losing part or all of their deposits in a case of a bank run, 
or they may decide to cash in their deposits in the short run, 
contrary to their initial plan, and thereby receive little or no 
return while securing a receipt of their money deposited. 
That is, a long term depositor’s strategy is to weigh his 
mistrust of other long term depositors concerning their 
withdrawal of deposits from the bank against the higher 
return he gets by keeping the deposit for a longer period of 
time. 
 




planner which combines short and long term deposits to 
maximize total welfare of all depositors in an environment 
of full certainty, despite the uncertainty that each depositor 
experiences. The law of large numbers allows the bank to 
act in an environment of full certainty because the bank has 
many customers and the bank knows, based on past 
experience, that a certain proportion of customers are short 
term depositors and the rest are long term depositors. The 
bank invests its pooled deposits in long term funds at a 
certain positive return (suppose, for the sake of a numerical 
illustration, as is done below, that 1 unit invested yields 2 
units at the end of a long term), while if long term funds are 
redeemed in the short run, no yield is accrued (i.e., 1 unit 
invested yields the same 1 unit). Given that depositors’ 
aversion to risk is greater than one  that is, their relative 
risk aversion as measured by their utility function is greater 
than one  the bank’s maximization of total utilities of 
depositors is superior to a market solution in an environment 
of uncertainty. The maximization process of the bank, acting 
as a central planner, yields two potential equilibria; (1) a 
‘good’ equilibrium, where all depositors stick to their initial 
decisions concerning the time of withdrawing their deposits 
from the bank. The outcome of the ‘good’ equilibrium is 
better than any other possible outcome, as mentioned above, 
and (2) a ‘bad’ equilibrium, where the bank will run out of 
liquidity because long term depositors run on the bank at the 
time the short term depositors withdraw their deposits. Thus, 
the validity of the ‘good’ outcome is predicated upon the 
requirement that long term depositors will not change their 
decision by becoming short term depositors due to fear or 
panic. The lack of sufficient liquidity (should all depositors 
require their deposits simultaneously), however, which is 
inherent in the maximization process of the bank acting as a 
central planner, forces all long term depositors to be 
suspicious of each other. This leads to the impossibility of 
the bank’s existence. The impossibility of the bank’s 
existence is similar to a ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ (for a 
discussion of the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ see e.g., Gibbons 
(1992:2-4) argument as is now shown.   
 
Think of a situation where all short term depositors have just 
withdrawn their deposits from the bank as they planned. 
Observing this, some long term depositors may also decide 
to withdraw their deposits from the bank for fear that the 
bank might run out of liquidity should their counterpart long 
term depositors decide to withdraw earlier than they initially 
planned. Suppose the bank is now left with liquidity for only 
one more long term depositor should he wish to withdraw 
immediately his deposit from the bank, and that there are 
several long term depositors who might decide to withdraw 
their deposits from the bank. For the sake of illustration, 
assume that there are two remaining long term depositors 
who contemplate withdrawing their deposits from the bank. 
The matrix below depicts the payoffs of the two remaining 
depositors should they decide to withdraw their deposits or 
keep them in the bank (see also Gibbons (1992: 73-75), for a 
game theoretic scenario different from the ‘prisoner’s 
dilemma’ approach).  
 





















The interpretation of the above matrix is as follows. The 
letter R stands for ‘retain’ (i.e., do not withdraw funds from 
the bank) and the letter W stands for ‘withdraw’. There are 
four pairs of payoffs in the matrix (e.g., the pair 1,0 states 
that if depositor 1 decides to withdraw and depositor 2 
decides to retain, then the payoff of depositor 1 will be 1 
unit and that of depositor 2 will be 0 units). Accordingly, the 
pair of payoffs 2,2 indicates that if both depositors decide to 
retain their funds in the bank, the payoff of each will be 2 
units (note that the pair of payoffs 2,2 is admissible for 
receipt only in the long term); if one depositor decides to 
retain his funds with the bank and the other to withdraw, 
then the one who retains will receive nothing and the other 
will get his investment back. If both depositors decide to 
withdraw their funds from the bank, each hopes to be first in 
the queue in order to get his initial investment back, hence 
the pair 1,1. This, however, is impossible because the bank 
has only 1 unit of liquidity. Hence, a strategy of 
withdrawing both depositors’ funds is one of bankruptcy.  
 
In an environment of uncertainty and mistrust, the only 
stable minmax solution is one where both depositors decide 
to withdraw their funds from the bank. Thus, at the outset 
this rules out the possibility of the bank’s existence. This 
anomaly has been addressed by Diamond and Dybvig 
(1983) by claiming that depositors should be insured against 
such contingency, or the central bank should act as a lender 
of last resort. Despite the implementation of remedies to 
deal with bank runs, the pair of payoffs 1,1 is still ruled out 
on a strategic ground. The failure of the above approach to 
explain the strategic existence of banks led Green and Lin 
(2000) to propose an argument as is delineated below.  
 
In order to resolve the above impasse, Green and Lin (2000) 
propounded the following scenario. Their scenario is similar 
to Diamond and Dybvig (1983) with the following 
modification. Suppose that when a rumour of run on the 
bank becomes publically known, all long term depositors 
who wish to withdraw their funds from the bank immaturely 
form a queue such that each one knows his place in the 
queue. It has been shown that under Green and Lin’s (2000) 
scenario it would be disadvantageous for each long term 
depositor to withdraw his funds from the bank immaturely. 
For, if the depositor is last in the queue he would 
immediately realize that he is better off leaving the queue: if 
he leaves the queue and waits longer he might receive from 
the bank 2 units for his investment, if however he leaves at 
the present time he might at best receive only 1 unit, but 
also, in a worst case, he might cause a bankruptcy of the 
bank. The second last long term depositor in the queue, 
knowing the strategy of the last depositor, will also decide to 
quit the queue, and so all long term depositors will 




bankruptcy is impossible, and the only minmax solution in 
the above matrix of payoffs is 2,2. The difficulty with this 
approach is that the formation of a queue, where each 
depositor knows his place in it, is a restrictive requirement 
in as far as it prevents any possibility of bankruptcy. In 
reality, when a panic about a bank failure is set out, all 
depositors scramble to collect their deposits and no orderly 
queue is formed. Being aware of that, in reality no depositor 
will employ a strategy as described above.  
 
It can be concluded that neither the strategic payoffs 1,1, 
based on Diamond and Dybvig (1983), nor the strategic 
payoffs 2,2, based on Green and Lin (2000), are relevant to 
describe the operation of banks. Therefore the investigation 
of the occurrence of bank runs and the remedial measures to 
prevent their occurrence should be sought in a banking 
structure that complies with the practical operation of banks. 
In reality, banks do not lend funds as a proportion of 
deposits they receive from customers, but they rather create 
loans to the public in exchange for IOUs from the 
borrowers. This banking practice will now be addressed. 
 
Loans make deposits 
 
It is a fact that banks lend funds to individuals and 
corporations in exchange for promises of the borrowers to 
repay those funds within a certain period of time. That is, 
banks lend funds, not as proportion to current deposits, but 
in exchange for borrowers’ IOUs as a means of surety to 
repay the loans. This practice is depicted in the bank’s 
balance sheet below (see e.g. Allais, 1987). 
 





(with a certain maturity) 
x amount 
 
Bank’s loans to customers 
(withdrawal on demand) 
x amount 
 
It is evident from the above balance sheet of the bank that its 
lending capacity is limited only by the credibility of the 
sureties that the borrowers present to the bank, while the 
credibility of those sureties is subject to the bank’s 
viewpoint. To demonstrate the creation of liquidity 
emanating from the bank’s balance sheet, consider the 
following. Observe that the creation of liquidity is simply a 
transfer of funds from one bank to another. Thus, label by A 
the current bank and label by B the bank to which the 
loanable funds from A are transferred. Accordingly, when a 
customer withdraws his loanable funds from A and deposits 
them in B, bank B concurrently assumes liability of the 
IOUs in Bank A’s possession (which are the securities of the 
borrower from bank A). Hence, the creation of liquidity is a 
mere interbank trade in IOUs. Thereby, bank A creates ex 
nihilo an extra quantity of x nominal units in the economy: x 
nominal units have been created without the need for 
demand deposits from customers. 
 
In light of the above it is apparent that during periods of 
economic upswing the borrowers’ sureties (in the form of 
IOUs) increase in nominal value, and therefore as a result 
the banks’ loans to their customers are fully secured by the 
nominal value of the securities which act as sureties. 
Conversely, during periods of downturn, the borrowers’ 
securities nominal value decline and as a result the banks’ 
loans are left unsecured. Therefore when the cycle of 
economic downturn is limited, the impact on the stability of 
the banking system and on the stability of the financial 
markets is also limited; when, however, the extent of the 
downturn is significant, a global financial crisis may result, 
as the world experienced recently. This latter observation is 
now outlined. 
 
When a decline in asset prices take place the banks’ nominal 
securities fall short of the nominal value of loans. If the 
decline in asset prices is deemed by the financial market to 
be prolonged, this can lead to a withdrawal of assets from 
banks and to a concurrent further drop in the banks’ share 
prices. As a result, the entire financial system may be in a 
threat of collapse. Note that the trigger of financial collapse 
has been a decline in asset prices because of an economic 
downturn. Thus, the stability of the banking system is 
susceptible to asset price stability.  
 
The market of mortgages 
 
The housing market is a leading factor of the business cycle. 
In a competitive environment, people trade on the basis of 
quid pro quo. The same applies to the market of mortgages. 
That is, banks offer mortgages in relation to the value of 
property purchased, while the property acts as collateral for 
the mortgage taken by the borrower. This practice is 
confirmed by the above bank’s balance sheet. Hence, during 
a period of housing boom the extent of mortgages is 
relatively high; and therefore, a downturn in the housing 
market can create a situation where the equity (i.e., 
borrowers’ IOUs in the form of the property owned by 
borrower) falls short of the money borrowed, resulting in a 
bad debt. If in addition the mortgagor is unable to service 
his loan, the bank has strong incentive to force him to sell 
his property as soon as possible. The outcome is a further 
decline in property prices and a decline in the value of the 
banks’ collaterals. A consequent sharp drop in the banks’ 
share price triggers a run on the bank. 
 
Based on the principle that loans make deposits, a financial 
broker can offer to the public financial derivatives whose 
underlying asset is the housing property, as has been done 
prior to the recent financial crisis. Although the nominal 
value of those financial derivatives is predicated upon the 
value of the housing market, they can be treated by a 
financial broker as financial assets on their own right. 
Therefore the financial broker can offer those derivatives to 
a bank as collateral against which the bank makes a loan 
(which is literally a demand deposit) in favour of the 
financial broker. Note that in this case no physical asset acts 
as collateral for the financial derivative, while the latter 
nevertheless acts as collateral for the loan. Moreover, the 
loan may be used for any purpose and is not limited to 
buying property. Based on the bank’s balance sheet, this 
accounting practice is admissible. During periods of 
economic upswing, this practice may lead to no difficulty 
because the underlying asset of the derivative appreciates in 
value and thereby creates the market perception that the 




downturn, however, the bank may realize that those 
derivatives are worthless because they have no financial 
value. This is an example of the extent by which banks can 
create liquidity ex nihilo, and is a clear presentation how the 




The implication of the above analysis is that the stability of 
the financial system, of which the banking system is a major 
component, depends on the stability of the real economy. 
Therefore an orderly functioning of the financial system 
depends on a suitable monitoring of the business cycle of 
the economy. That is, the central bank should employ a 
monetary policy of setting short term interest rates such that 
during an economic upswing the short term interest rate be 
raised, and interest rate be lowered during periods of 
downturn (this sounds obvious, but major central banks did 
not follow such a policy prior to the recent financial crisis). 
Such a policy renders business cycles less pronounced, and 
such a policy ensures that collaterals maintain stability of 
their monetary value. Conversely, when banks’ activities are 
instead curtailed by a regulator, this would lead to a 
curtailed economic activity without reducing the potential 
for a banking and financial instability. This can also 
exacerbate the risk of failure of the banking and financial 
system because customers who cannot receive loans from 
accredited banks will resort to other financial institutions 
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